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BOOK REVIEWS
EQUAL Ty. New York: Random House, 1965. Pp. xxv, 191. $4.95.
"Equality" is a collection of five essays dealing with the controversial
concept of "affirmative action" as a solution to the problems of racial discrimina-
tion. The proponents of "affirmative action" reject the thesis that the United
States Constitution is "color blind," and instead urge the federal and state gov-
ernments to enact laws which deliberately take race into account to combat
racial discrimination. The "Equality" contributors,1 five lawyers who have been
professionally and organizationally involved in the problem of racial discrimina-
tion, have neither hostility nor doubt about the propriety and necessity of
"affirmative action." They recognize that the standard of color-blindness will
hardly begin to satisfy the irrepressible demands for racial equality.
2
There is no compartmentalization of subject matter among the contributors.
It appears that each was given carte blanche to write an essay on the problem
and to define, describe, analyze and offer remedies as he or she saw fit. Thus the
three principal sectors-employment, housing, and education-all receive atten-
tion. Included among the essays are historical summaries, economic analyses,
statistical delineations, sociological insights, and some illuminating case-history
illustrations. Legal problems are considered and discussed to various extents, but
the approach seems deliberately aimed at the informed, or eager to be informed,
non-lawyer.
At some point each of the essayists considers the congeries of problems
embraced in the concepts of racial preferences, compensatory treatment, and
quotas, and indeed it is the continuing debate over these "explosive issues"
3
which inspired the book. The authors as a group espouse these concepts and
most of their implementations.4 But sensitive to the prevailing public concern
1. Charles Abrams, Loren Miller, Dorothy Kenyon, Robert L. Carter and Peter Marcuse.
2. Starting in 1954 with the landmark decision of Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483
(1954), the Supreme Court has consistently held that state laws requiring racial segrega-
tion in the use of public facilities are unconstitutional violations of the equal protection clause
of the fourteenth amendment. See, e.g., Gayle v. Browder, 352 U.S. 903 (1956) ; Turner v.
Memphis, 369 U.S. 350 (1962); Johnson v. Virginia, 373 U.S. 61 (1963); Schior v. Byrum,
375 U.S. 395 (1964). See generally, 2 Emerson & Haber, Political and Civil Rights in the
United States, ch.VII (2d ed. 1958). The significance of these decisions is the Court's deliberate
abandonment of the notion of "separate but equal," as imposed in Plessy v. Ferguson, 163
U.S. 537 (1896), as constituting compliance with the equal protection clause. Although Brown
marked the end of the era when racial discrimination might be overtly imposed and required
by law, the fact that it did not end racial inequality in the United States, much less produce
a paradise in race relations, is amply demonstrated by the events of the last several years.
See Farmer, Freedom, When? (1966); Warren, Who Speaks for The Negro? (1965); Hentoff,
The New Equality (1964); Silberman, Crisis In Black and White (1964); Zinn, SNCC-
The New Abolitionists (1964); Redding, On Being Negro in America (1951); Karpatkin,
Book Review, 202 The Nation 134 (1966). It is increasingly recognized that the elimination
of prohibitions has not and will not end racial discrimination in education, housing, and
employment. "Affirmative action" is the solution urged by the "Equality" contributors.
3. Book jacket.
4. For a well-reasoned presentation of the case against preferences and quotas, see
Pfeffer, The Case for and Against Quotas, Compensation and Unlawful Demonstrations, 2
CLSA Law Commentary 3 (1964).
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over the unorthodoxy of these ideas and practices, they approach the issue very
cautiously. Good lawyers all, they take particular pains not to introduce un-
familiar or unpopular material, without first laying a proper and elaborate
foundation. 5
The first essay is written by Charles Abrams, former Chairman of the New
York State Commission Against Discrimination, and an internationally distin-
guished authority on public housing. Although billed as a "foreword" to the
chapters contributed by the other four, in fact, it stands on its own as a sub-
stantive contribution to the discussion.
Mr. Abrams provides a good introduction to the problems under review, by
discussing two cases which have precipitated discussion of so-called benign
quotas:0 Progress Dev. Corp. v. Mitchell,7 and the case history involving the
New York City Housing Authority's "phase" programs. 8 Progress reflects the
successful effort by the Village of Deerfield, Illinois, a Chicago suburb, to frus-
trate the attempted development of a racially integrated middle-income com-
munity. The developer, Progress Development Corporation, proposed to sell
approximately twenty percent of the houses to Negroes, and to control the
racial balance of that proportion via resale agreements. When the municipal
authorities immediately took action to condemn the property, for transparently
racist reasons, Progress sued for an injunction in federal court. The court found
that plaintiff had failed to prove any bias or discrimination in the hasty con-
demnation and ruled for the defendants. At the same time it held that plaintiff
did not have "clean hands" inasmuch as its intended plan would be unenforcible
under the fourteenth amendment. The court claimed to follow Shelley v. Krae-
mer,O which held racial restrictive covenants invalid. Throughout the Progress
5. The most extreme illustration of careful laying of a foundation is in Dorothy
Kenyon's contribution. Judge Kenyon does not expressly articulate her position until the
next to last page of her 54-page essay. P. 92.
6. The adjective "benign" is an unfortunate choice with which to characterize a quota
device calculated to promote the desirable social objective of racial integration. The word
suggests to this writer an analogy with the layman's notion of medical pathology, the dis-
tinction between "benign" and "malignant" tumors. But who wants a tumor? No tumor is
desirable, even one which is "benign." It is at best something foreign to and inconsistent
with the body organism, but not likely to do any harm, and not likely to spread. Moreover,
the medical semantics are outdated. The present teaching is that there is no hard and fast
line between benign and malignant growths. See 5 Lawyers' Medical Cyclopedia '§ 38.15
(1960): "It must be borne in mind that some tumors pathologically classified as benign may
nevertheless pose a serious threat to health or be fatal." Id. at 495. Cf. Bollo, Introduction
to Medicine and Medical Terminology (1961). "[Sjome may begin as benign but later become
malignant." Id. at 181.
If one must have a medical analogy, I would rather suggest the notion of an anti-toxin,
the introducing into the body of a drug containing the potentiality of a small amount of
harm, for the purpose of serving a greater good.
7. 182 F. Supp. 681 (N.D. Ill. 1960), modified, 286 F.2d 222 (7th Cir. 1961), complaint
dismissed, 219 F. Supp. 156 (N.D. INl. 1963). See Note, Benign Quotas: A Plan for Integrated
Private Housing, 70 Yale L.J. 126 (1960).
8. N.Y. State Comm'n Against Discrimination, Report on Informal Investigation of
Tenant Selection Practices and Policies of New York City Housing Authority, Investig. No.
981-60 (1962).
9. 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
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opinion, the developer's motive was criticized1 ° and the defendants' motives
were held irrelevant. 1
Mr. Abrams takes solace from language in the opinion which he interprets
as suggesting that benign quota systems would be permissible if enacted by a
public agency, but not by a private developer. 12 He is, however, much too
generous about its implications. As I read the case, the court was overtly hostile
to the plaintiff's integrationist motive and unblushingly sympathetic to the
apparent motives of the defendant.
13
The second case cited by Mr. Abrams, that involving the New York City
Housing Authority's phase program, is in itself evidence that those hostile to
racial integration do not make the fine distinction which Abrams hopefully
extracts from the Progress case. In an effort to cope with the tendency of low-
income housing projects in New York City to become all-Negro and Puerto Rican
occupied, the Authority quietly set up a complicated "phase program," the
essential thrust of which was to control the racial balance in the projects. It in-
volved simultaneous efforts to give preference to white applicants in projects
which were becoming increasingly Negro and/or Puerto Rican occupied, and to
give preference to Negro and Puerto Rican applicants in projects which were
largely white occupied.'
4
The New York State Commission on Human Rights (then the New York
State Commission Against Discrimination) unhesitatingly assumed jurisdiction,
although no formal complaint had been made, and condemned the practice as a
violation of the New York State anti-discrimination law.15 The opinion of
Commissioner Katzen is replete with turgid reiterations of the obvious, but does
not meet the crucial question as aptly stated by Mr. Abrams: "If the Housing
Authority was trying in good faith to prevent segregation, was it intending to
violate'the law's true purpose or seeking in fact to observe it?"'1 (
The Authority was not able to withstand the attack and retreated. A walk
through any one of a number of low-income projects will demonstrate that the
problem it sought to cope with is as ubiquitous as ever, 17 and has serious ramifica-
tions in terms of school segregation. Thus, notwithstanding Mr. Abrams' op-
10. Progress Dev. Corp. v. Mitchell, 182 F. Supp. 681, at 709: "[Wihen all is said,
[plaintiff] has as its object the motive of profit not only for its stockholders but also for its
promoters."
11. Id. at 712: "This court cannot consider the motives of the Commissioners of the
Deerfield Park District in instituting condemnation proceedings against the premises .... 
12. P. xx.
13. See, e.g., Progress Dev. Corp. v. Mitchell, 182 F. Supp. 681, at 706: "Most of these
people have all their life savings invested in their homes and the prospect of losing that
security was a greater factor than the thought of Negro neighbors." Also, id. at 707: "While
all this was happening, defendant[s] . . .took stock and concluded that it was an ill wind
which blew no one any good ... [Tjhey believed it was an opportune time to call another
referendum . . ." (to obtain park land, an earlier referendum having been defeated).
14. Pp. xv-xvlii.
15. See supra note 8.
16. P. xviii.
17. This writer's personal knowledge is limited to New York City. But I doubt if the
situation is substantially different in other large cities with growing non-white populations.
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timism to the contrary, the same "a-quota-is-a-quota" thinking which led to the
defeat of a plan for private integrated housing in Deerfield, led to the defeat of
a measure seeking to protect public integrated housing in New York.
In all of the articulated opposition to racial quotas as a device to promote
racial integration, at least two groups are discernible. The first is that of the city
fathers of Deerfield and their supporters and apologists in low and high places,
whose sincerity about opposition to racial discrimination may very much be
open to question. The second group, however, consists of persons and organiza-
tions whose sincerity has been established by decades of committed struggle for
racial equality. This group consists of those for whom quotas and quota systems
were the personification of anti-minority bias.' 8 Mr. Abrams recalls that until
the present discussion, quotas suggested, by and large, two phenomena in Ameri-
can life: the national origins quota system of our xenophobic immigration laws,
and the deliberate quota restriction of Jewish students in medical schools. To
these veterans of the anti-discrimination struggles of many years, to these diligent
advocates of anti-discrimination laws, quotas are anathema. Abrams gives their
arguments due and respectful treatment, hints that his own view is however
different, and then at the point of advocacy, he seems to withdraw, as if his own
views are not yet firm.
Drawing on his many years of close study of public housing, he outlines a
program of affirmative proposals, all requiring federal action, which would if
implemented, do a great deal to promote integrated communities. These include
nominal interest loans for home ownership; extension of anti-discrimination
measures to savings and loan associations; increased income limits in public
housing; exertion of creative pressures against persistently exclusionary suburbs
(Deerfield?); rent subsidies; urban renewal on open land rather than by
levelling Negro areas and thereby further concentrating racial ghettos.19 His
conclusion, perhaps unnecessarily meek, is that until the gross deficiencies are
corrected by such measures, both public and private experimenters with quota
devices "merit a better understanding of their problems instead of a blanket
condemnation."2 o
Judge Loren Miller writes with the distinguished credentials of having been
successful counsel in Shelley v. Kraemer.' Shelley is the case which directly held
that the processes of the law will not be available to enforce a racially restrictive
covenant, and by implication, that the law cannot be an instrument of enforce-
ment of any racial discrimination. 22 However, Shelley did not produce inter-
18. See Pfeffer, supra note 6, at 7-9.
19. P. xxiv.
20. P. xxv.
21. 334 U.S. 1 (1948). With characteristic modesty he does not even cite this epochal
decision. Loren Miller's impact on the contemporary scene is not only as advocate and Judge
of the Municipal Court of Los Angeles. He wrote a seminal article, Farewell to the Liberals,
195 The Nation 235 (1962), which brilliantly foreshadowed the present "black power" debate.
22. See supra note 2.
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racial residential communities any more effectively than Brown resulted in
integrated schools.
judge Miller begins his essay by comparing Whitney Young's massive
"Marshall Plan" approach, an intense multi-billion dollar special effort to narrow
the economic, social and educational gap between Negro and white Americans,
with Thaddeus Stevens' proposal to compensate former slaves by an award of
forty acres of land Y3 A variation of Stevens' plan was enacted in early post-
Civil War legislation, but it did not survive the collapse of Reconstruction. Judge
Miller then gives the reader a short course in the history of the Negro in the
United States2 4 up through the present Negro revolution with its slogan of
"Freedom Now."
His approach to the problems of quotas and preferences is shaped by the
history which he recites. Notwithstanding all of the legal victories and all of the
"progress" which has undeniably been made, "the back wheels never catch up
with the front wheels on the buggy."2 5 "Freedom Now" describes the revolution
"against the arrangement of American life that disadvantaged the Negro from
the cradle to the grave." 26 "Freedom Now," as Miller sees it, means that the
Negro is no longer satisfied with "progress" in race relations. He wants "an even
start with all other Americans-now, today, under his own leadership and di-
rection and on his own terms.
2 7
Since there can be no equal start unless the cradle-to-grave disadvantages
are overcome, the necessity of some form of compensation is a logical imperative,
and hardly receives any justification beyond historical account. Therefore Miller
vigorously advocates, at least in government employment and perhaps generally,
an "announced policy of preference for Negroes who do qualify for promotion"
and the "rigid and ruthless pursuit of such a policy."
2 8
However, after vociferous advocacy of the propriety and necessity of
preferences, Miller becomes much more circumspect as he approaches the legal
ramifications. He notes that the original intent of the fourteenth amendment was
corrective-"a command to the States to take affirmative action to confer equality
on Negroes. '"9 He then itemizes various established precedents of singling out
certain groups for preferred treatment, all without any constitutional impedi-
ments; e.g., trade unionists who have been the victims of discrimination, handi-
capped persons, women, children, and veterans.30 Nevertheless he concludes by
suggesting "a way out of the constitutional impasse" via massive assistance of
23. Pp. 4-6.
24. He has since published a complete historical narrative. Miller, The Petitioners: The






30. Pp. 32, 29.
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depressed areas-the poverty program-as a vehicle for reaching the Negro
populations' without the use of an explicit policy of preferences.
Thus, Loren Miller suggests an ostensibly color-blind method to reach an
avowedly color-conscious goal in order to avoid a constitutional "impasse."
Regrettably, Miller has never clearly defined this "impasse." Moreover, such
constitutional discussion as he does present suggests that the impasse "is more
apparent than real."
32
Dorothy Kenyon's section headings ("What We Face Today," "What We
Are After," "Habits and Customs," "The Supreme Court and Public Attitudes"
and "Words, Words") are suggestive of the leisurely, discursive piece which she
has contributed. Out of her vast experiences 3 as a civil rights and civil liberties
advocate, she presents what is in effect an orientation lecture, intended for the
intelligent, well-disposed, but perhaps not-too-well informed layman. She does
not resist the temptation to offer asides, or to occasionally meander off on a
tangent, but everything she writes is interesting.
She has no doubts about the central policy questions which plague her
colleagues. For her, the issue is simply "How to Compensate for Years of Dis-
crimination Without Counter-Discrimination. 234 Therefore while she supports
"compensatory" treatment, she opposes "preferential" treatment because
if it involves choosing between a white or a Negro man, equally quali-
fied ... then it is definitely discriminatory, will operate as unfairly
against the white man as it has in the past against the Negro, and
should not be permitted. 35
She goes on to propose a number of indirect methods which will, presumably,
"compensate" without being preferential. As the first of these she commends
President Johnson's proposal for the appointment of fifty women to high policy-
making posts in government, and suggests that the same conscious selection
process be applied in the recruitment of Negroes.2 0 If the reader looks for the
rationale which makes such a conscious selection of women or Negroes "com-
pensatory" (and therefore permissible) rather than "preferential" (and therefore
discriminatory) it will not be found. Judge Kenyon cannot hide her delight at
this proposal and observes "if this were discriminatory, as I have no doubt it




33. Dorothy Kenyon has been a member of the New York Bar since 1917. She was
appointed to the New York City Municipal Court by Mayor Fiorello La Guardia in 1939,
but not reappointed by his successor. She has been a member of the Board of Directors of
the American Civil Liberties Union since 1931, and is currently Chairman of its Equality
Committee.
An early unfriendly witness before the McCarthy subcommittee, she has told friends
that she intends to bequeath to her alma mater, Smith College, a huge collection of mail,






Concluding her essay, Judge Kenyon offers an interpretation of the equal
protection clause which is of considerable more utility than efforts to distinguish
between "compensatory" and "preferential." The fourteenth amendment, she
writes, allows "differential treatment" under certain circumstances:
permitting it where the differences between authentic groups are such
as to make the results of differential treatment reasonably likely to
produce more genuine equality than the mathematical type of identical
treatment.38
No one has been more intimately involved with the legal struggle for racial
equality than Robert L. Carter, the eminent General Counsel of the National
Association for the Advancement of Colored People.39 He was the NAACP
counsel for Oliver Brown, in the trial and appellate courts, culminating in the
first of the five school desegregation cases which were heard and decided together
as Brown v. Board of Education.40 While his legal efforts in confronting various
types of racial discrimination in the Southern milieu have been spectacularly
successful,41 his more recent concentration on the Northern school scene has met
with considerable frustration.4s This frustration stems from the enormously
greater difficulty in establishing and implementing the constitutional and legal
principles necessary to overcome racial discrimination not openly ordained by
statute.
Where some of the other essayists paused, hinted or detoured around the
question, Mr. Carter proceeds to present a reasoned constitutional case for
38. P. 92.
39. The Legal Department of the NAACP, which Mr. Carter heads, is not to be con-
fused with the NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund, Inc. The Fund is an independent
legal defense organization which is not organizationally related to the Association. During
its early years the two were closely associated in the public mind because of the prominence
of Mr. Thurgood Marshall (formerly U.S. Circuit Judge and now Solicitor General of the
U.S.) who was Director-Counsel of the Fund and Special Counsel to the Association.
40. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). Mr. Marshall was counsel in the accompanying South Carolina
case; Mr. Spottswood W. Robinson, III (now U.S. Dist. Judge for the Dist. of Columbia)
in the Virginia case; Messrs. George E. C. Hayes and James C. Nabritt, Jr., (now President
of Howard University, and until recently, on leave as Ambassador to the United Nations)
in the District of Columbia case; and Messrs. Louis L. Redding and Jack Greenberg (cur-
rently Director of the Fund) in the Delaware case. This reviewer cannot resist this name-
dropping because he was, during the preparation of the Brown briefs, employed as a legal
assistant by Messrs. Marshall and Carter. For the special efforts involved in these cases, the
services of these and a large number of other lawyers were combined under the overall leader-
ship of Mr. Marshall, and coordination of Mr. Carter.
41. See, e.g., NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963) ; Gibson v. Florida Legis. Investig.
Comm., 372 U.S. 539 (1963); Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 (1960); NAACP v.
Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958).
42. Compare Blocker v. Board of Educ., 225 F. Supp. 203 (E.D.N.Y. 1964), and
Balaban v. Rubin, 40 Misc. 2d 249, 242 N.Y.S.2d 973 (Sup. Ct. 1963), rev'd, 20 A.D.2d 438,
248 N.Y.S.2d 574 (2d Dep't), aff'd, 14 N.Y.2d 193, 199 N.E.2d 375, 250 N.Y.S.2d 281, cert.
denied, 379 U.S. 881 (1964), and Vetere v. Allen, 41 Misc. 2d 200, 245 N.Y.S.2d 682 (Sup.
Ct. 1963), modified, 21 A.D.2d 561, 251 N.Y.S.2d 480 (3d Dep't 1964), aiJ'd, 15 N.Y.2d 259,
206 N.E.2d 174, 258 N.Y.S.2d 77, cert. denied, 382 U.S. 825 (1965), with Bell v. School City,
213 F. Supp. 819 (N.D. Ind.), aff'd, 324 F.2d 209 (7th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 924
(1964), and Barksdale v. School Comm., 237 F. Supp. 543 (D. Mass.), rev'd, 348 F.2d 261
(1st Cir. 1965). See Carter, De Facto School Segregation: An Examination of the Legal and
Constitutional Questions Presented, 16 W. Res. L. Rev. 502 (1965).
864
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preferences, quotas, and any other rational expression of affirmative action.43
Citing material which is obviously drawn from some of his own cases, he attacks
the frequent hypocrisy of the cry of color blindness by demonstrating that school
site selection is often unavoidably color-conscious. The color-consciousness is
there. The question is whether it is used to extend or to reduce racial segregation.
Consequently, "attendance plans drawn with a deliberate attempt to accomplish
desegregation" are not invalid because based on racial considerations. 4 Thus,
consideration of the negative and positive implications of color-consciousness
seems to compel constitutional sanction to taking race into account.
Carter then notes all the precedents for constitutionally-approved recogni-
tion of "group status," and the argument that general anti-poverty programs will
include fifty percent of the Negro population 4 5 However, he shows impatience
with the repetition of these arguments for indirect compensation, and observes
that:
There is nothing in the law to legally preclude as such a governmental
regulation expressly designed to assist poverty-stricken Negro families.
The law need not reach all of the nation's impoverished. The present
Federal program most certainly cannot. Abstract symmetry is not re-
quired 46-So long as those similarly situated are afforded equal treat-
ment within the reach of the regulation, no fundamental questions of
legality or constitutionality are presented. 47
The argument has been advanced by some that notwithstanding the con-
stitutional permissibility of taking race into account, the existence of a civil
rights statute precludes preferential treatment of Negroes.4 8 The unarticulated
(and startling) minor premise is that certain anti-discriminatory measures can
be undertaken in the aisence of an anti-discrimination statute, but not in its
presence. Carter points out in an employment context,49 as did Abrams with
reference to housing, "this would amount to a complete distortion of the reasons
for the law's enactment." He then makes the vital distinction between the long-
term objective of society, and the present situation: "Conceivably, when the
millennium arrives and Negroes are no longer subject to discrimination, then
perhaps that case could be made."50
The same reasoning leads Carter to the opinion that there is no constitu-




46. The essayists were apparently enjoined to avoid citations, but there is powerful
Supreme Court authority for this proposition. See, e.g., Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348
U.S. 483 (1955); Tigner v. Texas, 310 U.S. 141 (1940); Buck v. Bell. 274 U.S. 200 (1927).
47. Pp. 98-99. In Carter, supra note 41, he further develops the constitutional justifica-
tion for the entire array of affirmative measures in coping with de facto school segregation.
48. See authorities cited supra notes 7, 8. See also Marcuse, Benign Quotas Re-examined,
3 J. of Intergroup Relat. 102 (1962).
49. See generally Conference Issue-Toward Equal Opportunity in Employment, 14
Buffalo L. Rev. 1 (1964).
50. P. 99.
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chance to get off the ground." 51 But he does have some very definite policy
reservations as to the wisdom of negative housing quotas, i.e., those that seek to
limit the proportion of Negroes in a given project or community to avoid a
racially segregated result.
It is clear that he is not concerned about positive quotas, that is, compelling
a certain minimum of Negro members to preclude racial imbalance in a school, or
employment or residential facility. He is not concerned about quotas which
force consideration of race to bring in Negroes. He is concerned about quotas
which keep out Negroes, even temporarily, in order to promote integration,
although he does not see any legal distinction between this and any other bona
fide affirmative device. The objections he raises deserve serious consideration.
First he suggests that the entire problem of quotas arises from the un-
critical acceptance of the "tipping point" doctrine: that as a residential facility
integrates, once the non-white population reaches a certain proportion, there is
an irreversible trend to white abandonment and the facility rapidly becomes
completely segregated. Mr. Carter notes that housing experts are no longer un-
animous in their analyses of the tipping point phenomenon.
5 2
But one may ask if the problem of negative quotas, is merely a problem in
housing. It is at least as serious a problem with regard to racial balance in schools.
When school boundaries are drawn in integrated urban areas, persons working
to promote racial balance are as concerned with removing Negro children from
all-black schools and placing them into integrated schools, as they are concerned
with keeping the schools integrated, and thereby preventing an integrated school
from becoming all black.
53
Second he suggests, but unfortunately does not develop the argument, that
the quota concept may be misused so as to result in tokenism. 4 To this reviewer,
this is a serious but not insuperable obstacle. Obviously if housing or education
administrators in enlightened New York City decide on a thirty percent quota,
what is to stop less enlightened administrators in Birmingham or Memphis from
deciding that ten or five or two percent is all that can be permitted before the
whites flee, and to hypocritically cite New York as a precedent? The answer, it
would seem, is that such transparent devices would be precluded by the courts,
and ultimately by the Supreme Court. Of course, there are always border-line
situations, but no novel doctrine is required to establish a denial of equal protec-
tion when the demonstrable purpose of limiting Negro enrollment or residency is
to substitute tokenism for genuine integration. There are increasing signs that
51. P. 102.
52. P. 100. But Mr. Abrams, who is a recognized housing expert, does not question the
validity of the tipping point. Abrams, Forbidden Neighbors 311-312 (1955).
53. Cf. the following statement: "An increase in the ratio of Negroes and Puerto
Ricans to whites in city public schools helps to precpitate movement out of the public schools
and out of the city." N.Y. State Educ. Comm'r's Advisory Comm. on Human Relations and
Community Tensions, Desegregating the Public Schools of New York City 11 (1964).
54. P. 102.
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federal courts at least will "not be that 'blind' court" that was described as
"unable to see what 'all others can see and understand.' ,55
Third much more serious, and perhaps unanswerable, is Mr. Carter's
circumspect reference to Negro ambivalence about quota limitations. It is one
thing to accept the wisdom or even the necessity of quotas, but it is quite another
to be the Negro who feels the rejection because he is in excess of the number.
Mr. Carter describes a personal incident which candidly reveals his position:
I remember becoming furious on accidently learning that in a housing
unit in which Negro occupancy was controlled in the interest of in-
tegrated living, accommodations to a Negro friend of mine, with an
application of long standing, had been refused, while several of my
white friends, who had just sought entry, were being offered apartments.
I could intellectualize about the larger wisdom of the restriction to
guard against white exodus, but the actual situation posed too great a
threat through my two sets of friends to my own sense of worth and
self-esteem. My mental process, therefore, could not prevent a feeling
of outrage and indignation at the injustices my Negro friend suffered
because of his color.56
It is a pity that Mr. Carter does not force this dilemma of conflict between
"mental processes" and "feeling of outrage" to a conclusion. Would he allow
his sense of worth and self-esteem to outweigh the desirability of an integrated
community? How would he vote if he were on the Board of Directors of the
housing unit, and a proposal were brought in to abolish controlled occupancy, and
to accept all applicants, first come, first serve? This is not the first occasion when
men of good will have had to face a clash of values. Nor is it the first occasion
when the clash is between a desirable public good and a contrary individual
interest, however valid and honorable. It seems almost self-evident that if quota
limitations serve a useful social purpose, such experiences as those described are
insufficient reason to abandon the policy.
Fourth, and of greater moment, is Mr. Carter's impatience and irritation at
the central position in the race relations debate attained by arguments about quo-
tas.57 He fears that "if we debate about these questions, we can pretend that the
problem of discrimination itself has been solved."5 s He cites a mass of economic
and social data to demonstrate (if any demonstration is necessary) that more
than a decade after the Brown decision, racial discrimination continues to be
rampant in every sector of American life, North and South.59 Since we are still
55. Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 270 F.2d 594, 608 (5th Cir. 1959) (Brown, J., dissenting),
rev'd, 364 U.S. 339 (1960) ; see also NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415,445-46 (1963) (Douglas, J.,
concurring opinion); NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958) ; Grosjean v. American Press




59. Pp. 110-32. Hardly a week passes without the disclosure of further evidence. See
Negro Jobless Up-Why?, N.Y. Times, May 25, 1966, § 4, p. 6; Kodak Management Voids
Pact on Hiring Unemployed Negroes, N.Y. Times, Dec. 24, 1966, p. 40.
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very much at the elementary stages of confronting and eliminating manifest and
sanctioned discrimination, he argues, it is at best an abstract intellectual exercise
to try to pin-point the proper metes and bounds of such refinements as "quotas,
preferences or compensations." 60
To this reviewer, this argument is well-taken, but proves too much. Mr.
Carter surely would not deny the necessity of taking affirmative as well as nega-
tive anti-discrimination measures. It is one thing to say that quotas and similar
affirmative measures are not the key issue. It is another to say that they are no
issue at all. If it is frustrating to debate quotas to the exclusion of more pressing
problems, it is a needless futility to argue that the quota problem should be
abandoned because it is of secondary importance. Precisely in the areas of urban
housing and education, there is a serious present problem of maintaining racial
balance. Mr. Carter's essay reinforces the conviction that quotas are one effective
-and constitutional-method of coping with the problem.0 '
Peter Marcuse brings to the problem his own special experience as civil
rights attorney, activist and community leader in a moderately-sized Northern
city.62 His essay is an effective admixture of undoubtedly eyewitness observations
with intellectual reflections. Without stating whether he is recounting a specific
Waterbury experience, he presents the history and dilemma of "OURS" (Open
Urban Regions Society), a hypothetical open occupancy movement "in a typical
Northern community." 63 The history of OURS ends with the "paradox" that
in order to maintain open occupancy, serious attention must be given to quota
techniques. It is unfortunate that Mr. Marcuse apparently agrees that it is a
paradox, i.e., a statement that is seemingly self-contradictory or opposed to
common sense, but perhaps true in fact.
Marcuse is prepared to use all affirmative measures in the fight for open
occupancy, and every variety of compensation and preference, except that which
would be most effective. He is so apprehensive about the use of quotas to promote
open occupancy that nowhere in his otherwise flawless, and sometimes brilliant
exposition, does he undertake to answer the specific dilemma which he presents.
Thus, although he appears to support "sophisticated attention" to location and
"occupancy policies" of public housing projects, 5 he avoids the word "quota."
And where he uses the word, he makes clear that he means only positive quotas,
as in employment, bringing in more Negroes 6 and not quotas to prevent an
60. P. 110; pp. 132-33.
61. "The only conclusion the facts permit is that the measures taken and the changes
they have made so far are not nearly enough." U.S. Dep't of Labor, Bureau of Labor
Statistics, The Negroes in the United States, Their Economic and Social Situations, Bull. No.
1151, June 1966, p. 47.
62. Mr. Marcuse practices in Waterbury, Conn., where he is Chairman of the Board
of New Opportunities for Waterbury (NOW), an anti-poverty Community Action Program.
He was formerly a Waterbury City Alderman, and has acted as counsel for NAACP, CORE
and other civil rights organizations in Connecticut and elsewhere.
63. P. 136.




integrated situation from becoming segregated. Elsewhere he brushes over the
problem with the suggestion "that the use of voluntary benign quotas... volun-
tary cooperation... in maintaining an integrated occupancy, is the mostdesir-
able of several unsatisfactory solutions.
'67
The failure to come to grips with the problem of quota techniques is all the
more perplexing in the light of Marcuse's lucid analysis of a number of related
concepts and devices. He argues the case for compensation with uncommon
persuasiveness. He is particularly effective in reducing the shibboleths of "color-
blindness" 68 and "discrimination in reverse,"169 as well as the notion that the
Negro is no different than prior waves of immigrants seeking entry into American
society.70 His evaluation of the constitutional problem, although more painstak-
ing, brings him to the same point as his fellow-essayists: "The Constitution leads
to rather than prohibits compensatory treatment.1
71
His intensive examination of the very notion of compensatory treatment
illustrates his characteristic precision:
If preference is desirable, who is it that should do the preferring?
Should it be compulsory for everyone, or for some, or should it be
entirely voluntary? Should it be required by law, can it be regulated
by law, or, indeed, is it even permissible under many existing laws?
If the purpose of preference is compensation, when have we reached the
point where enough has been paid? And who should do the paying-
only those who were guilty of discrimination in the past, or everyone,
regardless of his individual desserts? 72
67. P. 153. Mr. Marcuse refers the reader, modestly, and without benefit of citation, to
his article, supra note 48, and implies that he has nothing to add. In that article he concludes
that quotas are frequently the most effective, if not the only effective, device to produce an
integrited community. Id. at 109. But he fears that quotas include "sacrificing the welfare
of certain individuals for the possible benefit of a group, thus depriving such individuals
of certain fundamental rights guaranteed under the Constitution." Id. at 110. Therefore he
recommends only voluntary quotas, i.e., persuasion only without any legal enforcement
power. Mr. Carter's essay demonstrates that our Constitution does sanction the recognition
of group rights. See suPra note 45 and accompanying text. Indeed, the notion of non-recogni-
tion of groups is precisely that kind of shibboleth that one would have wished Mr. Marcuse
had put on his dissecting table.
A few other questions he might consider are: If it is permissible to persuade, is it not
permissible to encourage via financial subsidy? And if it is permissible to subsidize to en-
courage a desirable "voluntary" act, why is it not permissible to tax to discourage an unde-
sirable act? At what point does the voluntarism become coercive? And if Mr. Marcuse is
under the illusion that voluntarism will be effective in this field, he should take a stroll
through any one of a number of housing developments in New York City. If the situation
is different in Waterbury, one suspects that it is not due to voluntary persuasion and no
more.
To sum up this critique, quota techniques are among the various tools of affirmative
action available in pursuit of a public policy of racial integration. The constitutional and
policy arguments for and against them are essentially no different than the arguments for
and against other affirmative techniques. The invocation of quota techniques will not produce
the millennium. But the continuing resistance to using this tool where it is appropriate reveals







Marcuse's essay is replete with any number of such shafts of laser-like
analysis. He notes the "moral fervor with which the demand for preferential
treatment is opposed by many who consider themselves loyal friends of the
Negro . . .",73 and suggests: "It is almost as if such persons were glad of the
opportunity to separate themselves from the 'extremists' in the Negro com-
munity."
74
He agrees with Carter that it is neither legally necessary, nor logically required,
nor morally just, to seek to skirt the problem of compensation for Negroes via
poverty programs. "Color itself per se and not associated with any other eco-
nomic or social or intellectual characteristic, has been a disadvantage in our
society. 7 5 "Looking at color happens to be quite an accurate short cut to
identifying need, and avoiding its use makes such identification more difficult."70
How one approaches the relationship between color and need is also influenced,
Marcuse observes, by one's function. "The logician will start with need, the
picket captain with color, the adept polemicist will undoubtedly stress the inter-
connection.
7 7
No one is a more adept polemicist in projecting the interconnections between
color and need, between the civil rights struggle and the anti-poverty struggle,
than Peter Marcuse. He predicts that demands for compensatory treatment must
lead to demands "for an absolute increase in the available supply of goods and
services." 78 The broader social issue is how American society will respond to this
demand,7s or perhaps, what transformations will be required of American society,
as it inevitably responds to an irrepressible demandY80
More than a year has elapsed since the publication of "Equality," but events
demonstrate its continuing importance. There does not appear to be any other
single volume which brings together so compactly and so well, not one, bu five
able discussions of the law and policy problems in American race relations which
will undoubtedly persist for the next several years. If "Equality" receives the
wide circulation and careful reading it deserves it will be a valuable instrument of
progress towards equality.
MARVIN M. KARPATKIN
Member, New York Bar
73. P. 143.
74. P. 145. Cf. Herbert Marcuse, Industrialization and Capitalism, 31 The New Left 4
(Issue No. 31, May/June 1964): "[Tlhe idea of scientific neutrality . . . in relation to





79. He asks, and by no means rhetorically: "Does our society recognize an obligation
to help its citizens lead a full and rewarding life, decently housed, adequately clothed and
fed, educated to an appreciation of the wonders of the world in which they live, and able
to partake of them?" P. 190.
80. CI. Marcuse, The Anti-Poverty Program: Attack on the Symptoms or Attack on
the Source?, 3 Pratt Planning Papers 21 (1965).
